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CAPITALIST COALITIONS, THE STATE AND
'NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: CHILE, 1973-1988

After the breakdown of democracy in the early 1970s, Chile
became best known for the draconian neoliberal policies of
economic stabilization and restructuring that followed under
General Pinochet.

Those policies were responsible for Chile's

violent shift from a highly protected industrializing economy to
an open 1, f:ree·-market economy based on agro-extractfve exports-fruit, timber and fish.

Most ·studies favored statist and

ideologlcal explanations for that rapid cha-nge. 1

They pointed

oµt that Chile's military regime, and especially General
Pinochet, shielded highly ideological civilian ministers from the
resistance ·of industrialists and traditional grain-growing
landown~rs--the presumed dominant factions of the upper class·.
This article challenges that interpretation.

State strength

'
and ideological
considerations alone were-not sufficient to

account for the shift from import substitution industrialization
(ISI)

to

an open, free market economy.

A disaggregation of
'

capital,tsts and landowners showed tha.t shifting capitalist
coalitions (with varying power resources) were also necessary for
the formulation _and implementation of Chile's draconian
1 For examples of the statist-ideological explanation ·see,
Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative
Ec·onom.ics (Berkeley:- ·university of California Press, 1983);
Guillermo Campero, Los gremios·empresariales en el periodo- 19701983 (Santiago: ILET, 1984); Tomas Moulian and Pilar Vergara,
"Las fases del desarrollo 'politico chileno entre 1973-1978,"
Estudios Cieplan, no. 9, 1980.
1

neolib,ral policies.

A comparison acres~ three distinct policy

periodj in authoritarian Chile--which controlled for type of
governjent--strongly suggested that when coalitions changed so
did pojicy.

·

Reopening the debate over that brutal policy shift seemed
ing because tp.e Chilean case lent itself to a broader
ion of the relationship between state and society in
explana[ions of economic change.

The-central features of the

statist approach--centralization of authority, insulation of
technoc ats from pressure groups, ideological homogeneity among
top pol· cy-makers-·-were stronger in Chile than in comparable
cases sch as Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. 2

As a result,

Chile Offered a valuable initial test of the su_fficiency of thos·e
factors for ·explanations of economic transformation.
A rumber of key assumptions of statist and ideological
arguments merit challenge, in particular as they are applied to
Latin Jerica.

To begin with, at any given time there are

competitg ideologically-anchored policy alternatives.

The deeper

issue tarns on the factors that influence the triumph of one over
anotherl

A second question involves the choice to focus almost

exclusitely on ISI manufacturers and traditional landowners as
the onli upper class groups worth consideration.
2

I
I

•

•

.

A further
• .

•

For classic statements of the statist and ideological
approac~es see, Theda Skocpol, states and Social Revolutions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Stephen Krasner,
Defendirtg the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, ~978); Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade:
Institu,ions of Protection," American Political Science Review,
80, 1, 986.
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disagg egation of business and landowning groups allows for more
fluid

nd varied coalitions.

Lastly, linear conceptions of power

betweej social groups and the state-~analyses that focus on

confl~1ts between individual social actors and the state--are
inade~late to determine societal influence in economic
polic~aking.

Relational images of power, where power also

depends\ on the ability of class-based social groups to enter into

allian+s and coalitions against others, are more fruitful. 3
Another questionable feature of the statist approach is its

relian+ on the links between organized business and the state ta
determipe the degree of insulation of civilian economic ministers
from sobietal preesure. 4

some of the earlier literature on

authoribarianism recognized that the military

selected

influen ial persons to direct government economic agencies
because they presumably spoke for important business and
landowning constituericies. 5

But subsequent work rarely explored

the class-based background of highly ideological ministers of_,
economic affairs.

And when it did, it failed to systematically

tie those individuals to larger coalitions of capitalists and
3 For a discussion of this view of power see, Gosta Esping
Anderson, The Three·worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990).
4 For studies that focus on organized business see,
Guillermo Campero, Los gremios empresariales; and Philippe C.
Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change.in Brazil
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).
5 For the classic statement see, Juan J .. Linz, "An
.
Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan,
eds., Mass Politics:.Studies in Political Sociology (New York:
The Free Press, 1970).
3

landowners both inside and outside of business organizations. 6
Most current research has also neglected to explicate the role .of
such coalitions in formulating and shaping policy agendas, or to
determine their impact on economic policymaking.
Nevertheless, to formulate the debate in terms of state
autonomy v. societal forces seems unproductive.
undetermining. 7

Each is

This article addresses the need to examine the

relationship between state, societal and international factors in
the analysis of economic- change.

It explores how international

economic and domestic factors influence the formation, unraveling
and relative power capabilities of policy coalitions--all within
the context of an exclusionary authoritarian regime.

SOCIAL GROUPS, POLICY PREFERENCES AND POWER RESOURCES

Showing that shifting social coalitions also influence
economic policy outcomes in labor repressive authoritarian
regimes requires an examination of several interrelated
questions.

Which are the relevant social groups?

What

6 Guillermo O'Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism:
Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley:
University of .California Press, 1988), p. 72. For a study that
does link capitalist coalitions to.the state see, Sylvia
Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
7 scholars who have argued the point' include, Peter A.
Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to
international Economic Crisis. (Ithaca: Cornell University- Press,
1986); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Gr0wth: Financial
Systems and the Politics of industrial Change {Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983).
4

influences coalition formation and unraveling?

Why does one

' , h over another?
coa l i.t).ion t ri~mp

With respect to the first question, a disaggregation of
class-based social groups allows one to uncover more fluid and
varied coalitions.

Traditional industrial and landowning-groups

are not the only relevant upper class actors in the story of ·
economic change from ,ISI to an open economy in labor repressive
authoritarian regimes.

one way to disaggregate social groups is

to classify them according to their location in the international
economy--whether they produce for domestic or international
markets. 8

For Latin America, the choice seems warranted given

the nature of the two major developmental strategies in
contestation since the 1930s: protected industrialization, and
open economies seeking to exploit their comparative advantages
(usually in agricultural and,extractive industries).
Disaggregation according to location in the international
division of labor yielded the following groups for the Southern
Cone: manufacturers and landowners that produce for domestic or
international markets; financiers largely connected to
international or domestic-market oriented enterprises, or sources
of investment funds; and internationally oriented large-scale
extractive and commercial interests.

8 For this approach.to the disaggregation of class-based
groups see, P~ter Gourevitch,, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative
Responses to International Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell
Universitt Press, 1986).
5

Restricting attention to these groups is not accidental.
Regime type--the system of intermediation between state and
society--also influences which social groups participate in
coalition building. 9

Labor repressive authoritarian regimes,

such as Chile's, tend to bar all but large-~cale capitalist and
landowners from the politics of economic poli_cymaking.
In shifts from ISI to open economies one of the central
eonflicts between capitalist and landowning groups turns on the
issue of trade.

Thus, producers for domestic markets who are

uncompetitive in world markets should favor protection.

By the

same token, groups tied to internationally competitive sectors
tend to support more open economies.

Explicit ,and ·tacit

coalitions form among groups with complementary interests.
Establishing coalitions and their relationship to the state
before policy is adopted strengthens the hypothesis that
capitalist coalitions are a necessary factor in the analysis of
economic change in exclusionary authoritarian regimes. 10

It

shows that they play important roles in policy agenda setting and
formulation.

It also suggests that dominant coalitions are

crucial for policy implementation as well.

They must possess the

9 For this view of political regimes see, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in
Latin America," in David.Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism
in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
lO For the distinction_between inclusionary and exclusionary
regimes see, Alfred .Stepan, The.state and society: Peru in
Comparative Perspective (Princeton: ·Princeton University Press,
1978).
6

economic capacity to help propel a project. such coalitions may
need state or foreign help, but without them the policy may fail.
Demonstrating the existence of such pol1cy coalitions
demands an examination of policy debates that take place before
policy is adopted.

Authoritarian regimes often e'xclude peak

associations from policymaking in any meaningful way.

When the

latter p~otest government proposals and the authorities ignore
them it may seem that state actors have virtually unlimited
autonomy.

However, upper class elites also articulate their

economic interests by personalistic, ad hoc channels quite
separate from busines·s associations.

Therefore, one fruitful

avenue to uncover the relationship between stat·e and societal
actors is to examine the policy positions of the directors of
conglomerates that have either internationalist or domestic
market production profiles, as well as those of the peak
associations. 11

If capitalists with close connections-to th~

state mainly associate with one type of conglomerate, they
probably embody an e·xplicit or implicit coalition that controls
vital economic assets.
These considerations, however, leave.unanswered another
crucial question.

What factors contributed to the rise and

demise of tho.se coalitions?_ The catalyst for coalitional shifts
may come from either international economic shocks, domestic
economic and political crisis, or a combination of the two.

11 Conglomerates usually control significant sectors of

highly oligopolistic economies.
7

Both

create situations in which old policies no longer sustain
economic growth.

Adjustment to new economic conditions strains

the terms of the bargain that held the old coalition
together. 12
This raises a further question.

Although economic crises

may precipitate coalitional shifts, why does one coalition win
over another?

An analysis of the economic and political sources

of power and the relationship between them may help.

Here again,

inquiry benefits from an examination of international and
domestic factors.

F.or developing nations, foreign savings are a

significant component of development funds.

As a result, social

groups that can tap into them augment their relative economic
power because they can contribute to their nation's economic
growth and stability.
As Charles Lindblom and others point out, governments need
to provide both.

This brings up the issue of a coalition's

relative political power, an area in which attention to domestic
institutional factors.offers the most insight. 13

As a

coalition gains in economic strength a government may place its
representatives or agents in the executive branch.

control of

key decision-making institutions biases institutional sources~of
power in favor of one coalition over another.

This functional

relationship builds networks between two power resources:
12 For thi~ perspective on the role of world economic crisis
see, Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times.
13 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic
Books, 1977).
8

economic and political. 14

Military leaders need tne support of

private economic agents to sustain development efforts.
Capitalist coalitions need state power to translate their
economic preferences into policy.

The one cannot dispense with

the other.
A more instrumental approach to the relationship of state
and society has deep implications for the debate over the
interaction betwee·n capitalists, landowners and the state in
exclusionary authoritarian regimes. 15

The private interests

that the state seeks to coopt or incorporate--individuals and
firms--have a significance for economic policy outcomes·that goes
beyond their particularistic properties.
of dominant economic policy coalitions.

They stand at the core
Without them, and the

economic resources they command, state policy would either be
different, or, at minimum, unsustainable.
Moreover, studies of policy change during periods of
political crisis need to consider the impact of regime change and
past economic policies on the relative strength of competing
capitalist groups.

For example, in democracy, capitalist groups

may rely on alliances with labor against other capitalist groups ..
In authoritarianism they find themselves alone in naked intra14 For an elaboration of functional power sources and the
importance of networks between them see, Michael Mann, The
Sources of Social Power, Volume l· (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
15 For the instrumentalist approach to the state see, Ralph
Miliband, The State.in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books,
1969).
9

class conflict, which weakens them.

By the same token, agrarian

reform or nationalization efforts might substantially weaken some
sectors of the dominant class, providing opportunities for
er'stwhile more subordinate capitalist groups.
To summarize, international factors help to define classbased social groups by disaggregating them.
varied and fluid coalitions.

This allows for more

External and domestic economic

crises provide the catalyst for coalitional change.

Both

international and domestic factors have an impact on the relative
power capabilities of social groups.

Domestic institutional

factors shape policy networks, that is, which groups participate
in economic policy-making and under what conditions.

As an

economically strong rival coalition eme~ges, military leaders may
boost its political power by giving its agents cabinet positions.

THE CASES

A comparison across three distinct policy periods in
autho.ritarian Chile--graqual, radical and pragmatic neoliberal
restructuring--demonstrates a need to include social coalitions
in anaiyses of economic policy change. 16

As the next .,sections

show, in each policy period a distinctive capitalist coalition
formulated policy and established privileged networks with state

16 For a useful overview of these periods ·see, Carlos
Hurtado, De Balmaceda a Pinochet (Santiago: Ediciones Logo,
1988) •

10

institutions and actors.

When economic and political crises

precipitated shifts in dominant coalition, policy changed.

From Import Substitution to Gradual Adjustment, 1973-1975.

The economic and political crisis unleashed-by Uhidad
Popular's attempt to introduce socialism in Chile between 1971
and 1973 essentially destroyed the policy coalition that had
supported import substitution industrialization (ISI) in
democratic Chile.

The core of the populist ISI coalition had

consisted of manufacturers for domestic markets in tacit alliance
with organized urban labor mediated by centrist middle class
political parties.

The socialist experiment, however; united

capitalists, landowners, middle classes and their political party
allies against labor, peasants and leftist partie~. 17
The coup coalition agreed that it opposed socialist
policies, but it was' not of a mind with respect to the economic
development model that should follow.

Throughout 1973, during

both the preparations for and in the aftermath of Salvador
Allende's overthrow, economic policy debates picked up where they
17 For representative samples of the extensive lite.rature on
those periods of Chilean history see, Brian Loveman, Chile; The
Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979) and Barbara stallings, Class Conflict and Economic
Development in Chile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).
11

had left off in the late 1960s: whether to continue with an
economic development model that gave industry high protection,
and gradually stabilize the economy; to slm{l..y dismantle barriers
to trade and stabilize the economy; or to introduce draconian
economic stabilization and market liberalization.
The newly installed·military government opted for the m.iddle
policy alternative--a gradual approach. to import liberalization
and stabilization.

on January 10, 1974 the authorities decreed

gradual tariff reductions: from an average rate of 94% to 60% in
three years.

Devaluat1ons of·a unified exchange rate offered

additional protection.

The gradualist approach would open Chile

to regional markets (principally the Andean Common Market),
allowing manufacturers to adjust to heightened competition.
What were the patterns of support for the various policy
options in the chaotic months just before and after the coup in
September 1973?

In a climate of mass mobilization, sporadic

violence and subsequent massive repression, economic po'licy
debates continued more or less behind closed doors.

In them, a

significant inter-sectoral coalition supported the gradualist
option.

Backing for either continued.high protection or drastic

opening appeared scant.

The business associations of

manufacturers for domestic markets that could not compete with
imports--metals, electronics and textiles-,-supported continued
high levels of tariff protection.

However, industry's peak

association (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, SFF) joined the

12

landowner's peak association (Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura,
SNA), 18 in support of a gradual reduction of tariffs, along
with mine owners (Sociedad Nacional de Mineria, SONAMI) and the
large-scale commercial sector (Camara Nacional de Comercio, CNC).
As a result, the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC),
the peak association's umbrella organization, threw its weight
behind the gradualist approach. 19
The main reason for the SFF's acceptance .of a gradual
reduction in "protection for industry lay in the impact of
domestic factors such as past policy and a change in type of
government.

To begin with, Allende's nationalization policy

weakened industrialists economically .and diverted attention from.
tariff policy.

More importantly, _a debilitated SFF now stood

alone against other business and landowning groups that had long
wanted t_o reduce high tariff barriers in order to increase

18 Domestic market producers in agriculture opposed high
tariffs because they diverted investment to industry, but they
demanded (and got) protection via price floors and ceilings.
19 For the minority policy position within the SFF I -relied
on personal interviews with Gustavo Ra:mdoh:i;, former director of
the metal sector's association, and Orlando Saenz, president .of
the SFF at the time. These and all other intervie~s took place
in Santiago de Chile between July 1988 and. June 1989. For the
policy position of the SNA see, El Campesino, Noveml:,er 1973 and
January-February, 1974: for the CNCsee, Memorias Anuales, 1973
and 1974: I derived SONAMI's position from a personal interviews
with Manlio Fantini·, a member of -SONAMI 's elected board ·and
Carlos Rodriguez, SONAMI' s director . of planning·. For the SFF' s
stance see, El Mercurio, December 15, 1~73 and January 9, 1974,
as well as SFF president Orlando Saenz's speech in Informativo
SFF, February--March, 19?4. For the CPC's policy position I ·
relied on personal interviews with Manuel Valdes, organizer of
the Second CPC convention in December 1973, .· and media accounts of
the convention in El Mercurio, Ercilla, and El campesiho.
13

investment in their own sectors.

After all, in the democratic

period manufacturers for domestic markets had tacitly relied on a
non-business coalitional partner--organized labor, which
benefitted from increased employment.

Moreover, the SFF at times

had been able·to defend against government-sponsored tariff
reform by threatening to incite labor unrest. 20

The Allende

experience, and the labor-repressive military government that
followed, destroyed those relationships.

In other tyords, in the

context of more or less unmediated relations with the s~ate, the
SFF found itself bereft of alliance partners against other
business and landowning sectors, and with reduced economic power
due to nationalization.

These factors suggested that compromise

with-sectors that wanted to reduce protection, rather than
confrontation, was the better course of action.

After all,

industrial development still remained the primary·goal. 21
_ The SFF's·isolation in the CPC over the tariff question
combined with another factor to further ease acceptance of
gradual adjustment.

The majority of SF.F elected members operated

in internationally competitive firms, or .had multiple economic
interests.

Between 1973-i974, of a total of 31 elected members,

16 were occupied in internationally noncompetitive activities.
That suggests that there should have· been a spirited fight over
the issue of protection withii:i the SFF.

However, of those 16, 12

20 Personal interview with Sergio Molina, former Minister of
Finance in the mid-19·6os, Santiago de Chile, May, 1988.
21 El Informative SFF, February-March, 1974.
14

had interests in competitive sectors (mostly food processing)
that mitigated their need to vigorously support existing levels
of protection.
agriculture.

Six had interests in commerce, finance and
Four were executives of the Banco Hipotecario de

Chile (BHC) internationalist conglomerate.

Two worked for a

Multinational Corporation (MNC) . 2 2
Moreover, manufacturers for domestic markets wh·ose economic
interests were firmly planted in uncompetitive sectors, and who
had votes in the SFF, were a minority within the organization.
Their complaints and demands went largely unattended.

When the

issue gained a place on the SFF's agenda in the general council
it was voted down.23
After the coup d'etat, then, an explicit coalition of
business organizations operating,through the CPC worked with the
military government and its civilian advisors in the formulation
of the gradualist policy. 24

However, it was-but the outer,

22 These and all other prosopographical data on SFF members
and government officials were culled from: SFF, Memorias,
selected years~ Colegio de Periodistas, Diccionario Biografico
(selected years), company annual reports,. and Directorio de
Ejecutivos y Empresas (selected years).
23 Personal interview with Gustavo Ramdohr, former 0fficial
of the metallurgical sector association, Asociaci6h de Industrias
Metaltlrgicas, Santiago de Chile, 1988.
24 in December 1973, the CPC held a convention to discuss
policy recommendatio_ps., It support.ed privatization, price
deregulation, the creation of private capital markets and gradual
reduction in protection. During and after the convention private
sector leaders met with government officials to discuss policy.
Accounts of the convention are from El Mercurio, Ercilla, El
Campesino, and a personal interview with Manuel Valdes, the
principal organizer of the business summit, in 1989.
15

public side•of a private, inner coalition that furnished many of
the new military regime's civilian advisors.

Gradual.is ts

controlled this coalition as well, and the network of relations
between gradualists in the public and private coalitions
reinforced their dominance over extreme protectionists and
radical inte~nationalists alike.
After the final destruction of democracy, direct access to
powerholders (the military and well-placed civilian ·authorities)
privileged some groups over others who did not enjoy those
connections.

The distribution of civilians in top economic

policymaking ministries and advisory positions clearly reflected
the dominance of gradualists within the policy coalition.
the military rei.ied on gradua·lists was no accident.

That

Gradualists

had controlled both the busines~ mobilization against Allende-led by the Monday Club--and the development of a post-coup
economic program, The Brick, that the military commissioned.
before the coup.25
The character of the business conglomerates that dominated
the Monday Club and The Brick--the Edwards and the BHC groups-was the main indicator of the gradualists' control over the coup
coalition.

The Edwards g-roup was a type of traditional

conglomerate that had a concentration of assets in
·25 For the Monday Club and The Brick (El Ladrillo) see,
Philip O'Brien, The Pinochet Decade (London: Latin America
Bureau_, 1983); Arturo Fontaine, ·Los eco:riomistas y el presidente
Pinochet; Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepulveda,
La bistoria oculta del r~gimen militar (Santiago: Edit6rial La
Epoca, 1988) ..
16

noninternationally competitive sectors, but it also had sizeable
investments in internationally competitive activities.

As a

result, it initially supported graduc;tl adjustment because it
could shift assets mqre easily.

By contrast, the BHC group was a

more internat.:j..onalist conglomerate, particularly with respect to
the financial component, its strongest sector.

Of the Monday

Club's seven regular members five were top executives of the
Edwards conglomerate and two-. were from the BHC co"i1glomerate. Of
the Brick's ten regular members, six were evenly.divided among
the Edwards and BHC conglomerates.

The other four were Christian

Democrat economists and former Central Bank officials during the
Frei administration (1964-1970). 26

INSERT·TABLE 1

Many of the leading civilian authorities whom the military
junta appointed in 1973 were linked to the Edwards conglomerate,
which had stood at the core of both the Monday Club and the
Brick. 27

For example, Fernando Leniz, who became Economics

Minister in October 1973, was a prominent businessman with close

26 The Christian Democrat's participation in The Brick

reflected their position in the coup coalition. For their role
in the breakdown of democracy see, Arturo Valellzuela, The.
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978).
27 This does not mean that the persons who then occupied

government posts were.necessarily involved in the Monday Club_ and
the Brick. Nevertheless, their appointment reflected the Edwards
group's political power.
17

TABLE 1
MAJOR TRADITIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONGLOMERATES, 1970 AND 1977
CONCENTRATION OF COMPANIES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
(PERCENT)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4) (5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
%
%
%
%
DOM. MKT.
%
% PRI·
TOTAL TOTAL
YEAR &
INDUSTRIAL DOM. MKT.
DOM MARY
%
%
%
DOMINTER
NAME OF
TOTAL
NON·
INDUSTRIAL MKT. PROD. EX/IM FINANCIAL REAL ESTIC NAT'L
CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES COMPETITIVE* COMPETITIVE AG. EX.** TRADE INVEST.• ESTATE MKTS. MKTS.

(11)
%
·TOTAL
FIN/
SPECULATIVEi:t

(12)
%
TOTAL
FIN/
SPEC.
INT.

INTERNAT'L
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

74/Cruzat-L.
77/Cruzat-L.

11
85

9.0
7.0

27.2
23.5

36.4
25.6

27.2
18.8 15.9

9.4

36.2
30.5

36.4
44.4

27.2
25.3

63.6
69.7

74/BHC
77/BHC

18
62

16.7
12.9

5·_5

22.5

11.0
14.4

66.7
11.3 35.4

3.2

22.2
35.4

11.0
25.7

66.7
38.6

77.7
64.3

70/Angelini
77/Angelini

4
18

5.5

5.5

75.0
50.0

25.0
22.2

16.6

0
11.0

100.0
.72.2

0
100.0
16.6 88.8

70/Menendez
77/Menendez

8
10

10.0

10.0

25.0
40.0

62.5
30.0

12.5
10.0

0
20.0

87.5
70.0

12.5 100.0
10.0 80.0

77/Hochschild 12

8.3

16.6

41.6

25.0

8.3

24.9

66.6

26.4

2.9

2.9

52.9

14.7 26.4

5.8

15.1

23.0

19.9

28.2 15.2

38.1

46.1

8.3

74.9

FORMER
TRADITIONAL
1

77/Edwards

34

1

77/Matte

39

7.6

7.6

67.6 73.4
84.2

TRADIT.IONAL
1

70/Edwards

30

6.6

33.3

3.3

6.6

6.6

33.3

10.0 43.2

13.2

43.3 56.5

1

70/Matte

26

34.5

19.2

7.6

7.6

15.3

19.2

3.8 53.7

22.9

23.0 45.9

1

70/Luksic
77/Luks i C

16
29

20.5
3.4

43.7
41.3

24.2
3.4 20.6

6.2
17.2

68.7

6.9

6.9 48.1

31.1
37.8

0
31.1
13.8 51.6

77/Saenz

15

13.3

26.6

. 13.3 59.9

70/Lepe
77/Lepe

4

11

50.0
36.3

50.0
45.4

0

9.0

100.0
· 81.7

0

9.0

9.0

9.0 18.0

7
9

43.0
44.4

22.2

11.1

57.0
22.2

43.0
66.6

11.1

80.0
14.3

20.0
57.1

14.3

14.3

100.0
.71.4

14.3

1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

70/Yarur-B.
77/Yarur-B.

70/Briones /s
77/Briones.,,.,.., 7
/

•

46.6

39.9 39.9

0

0

0

57.0 57.0
22.2 33.3
0

0

14.3 28.6

Legend: Col1.11n (1): Nuooer of firms the conglomerate controlled; ·(2) Non-internationally competitive industrial
firms producing for domestic markets; (3)· internationally competitive firms producing ·for, domestic markets; (4)
Domestic market agriculture; (5) Primary product exports; (6) Export/ln.,art and trade related firms; (7)
Financial and investment firms; (8) Real estate; (9) % total firms producing for domestic markets; (10) % total
firms producing for international markets; (11) % total firms in the financial, investment or speculative
sectors Creal estate); (12) The same as col1.11n 11 plus% firms that produce for international markets.
* Competitiveness was established by industrial activity, not by individual firm, and the criteria were
taken from Guillermo Campero and Jose Valenzuela, El Movimiento Sindical en el Regimen Militar Chi Leno.
- Includes fishing, forestry, export agriculture and mining.
• Includes banks, investment c~nies·and insurance firms.
lit Speculative activities in finance, investment and real estate contributed to the financial bubble produced
by.free-market policies.
Source: Fernando Dahse, EL Mapa de La Extrema Rigueza (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1979).

ties to the Edwards and Matte conglomerates.

Roberto Kelly, with

links to the Edwards congl-omerate, became director of the Oficina
de Planificaci6n Nacional (ODEPLAN), the government planning
r

agency.

Orlando Saenz became coordinator for Chile's foreign

debt renegotiation team.

He had participated in the Monday Club,

headed Edwards conglomerate firms, and was a powerful figure in
the SFF, which under his direction led the private sector's
struggle against Allende.
Under them, the radical Chicago Boys--who had studied
neoclassical economics at the University of Chicago with Milton
Friedm·ari and Arnold Harberger--became important advis.ors in the
Ministry of Economy and .ODEPLAN, the planning agency.

These men

had connections to both the internationalist conglomerates (BHC)
and more traditional ones (Edwards).

Meanwhile; Christian

Democratic technocrats, who also favored gradualism,_ were
appointed to the Central Bank and the Budget Office.

Most of

these radical Chicago Boy and Christian Democrat appointees had
participated in The Brick.
Not all leading appointees had such close ties to
conglomerates involved in the Monday Club and The Brick, although
they too reinforced the dominance of the gradualist coalition in
government.

For example, Raul Saez, who headed the military

government's economic advisory team right after the coup--was
respected in ISI business circles beca·use he had been one of the
first directors of the state's Development Corporation (CORFO).
Aside from being a government ·holding company for many state
18

enterprises, CORFO bad also provided seed money for joint
!

ventures between thc\a -public and private sectors, as well as
I

credit fo.r industri~l development.
'

As a result of\these networks the leaders of the business
and landowning assoeiations--the outer, public gradualist
I

coalition--found cobgenial counterparts at the highest level -of
I

government with whom to exchange views on economic policy.

Major

''
I

policy disagreements between_big business and government
officials did not, for the most part, exist.

Moreover, the

:

ministries were very receptive to businessmen who sought to iron
out small ditferences or to gain some advantage.

From Gradual to Radical Neoliberal Adjustment, 1975-1982.

The gradualistiperiod
largely conformed to classical
.
!
l
I

observations of aut~oritarianism i~ Latin America.

Some of the

major groups that sti.ppo:rted the coup--middle classes and small
j

-

J

and medium business.1.-found to their dismay that government policy
l

ignored their interests.

Moreover, in tune with well-established

interpretations of ~ntersectoral relations in Latin America,
large-scale capitalists and landowners managed to find an
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I

accommodation over ~conomic policy. 28

All would be able to

adjust.
The initial acbommodation did not last long.

A lack of

cohesiveness in the\gradualist coalition contributed to the
abrupt end of gradual adjustment in mid-1975.
j

Between 1974 and

1978, Chilean capitalists and landowners--contrary to theoretical
I

expectation--behaved in a most unaccommodative fashion.

The

I

'

radical internationalist groups (who ·had been marginalized in
1973) challenged th~ more moderate elements of the gradualist
l

coalition and won. ; They supported the twin und_erpinnings of what
was to become the radical
neoliberal experiment:
drastic
'
deflation and rapid:economic transformation via draconian
reductions·in prote9tion for industry. 29 - The new policy was
radica-1 in the dracc;mian speed and thoroughness w:i th which
-

I

stabilization and m~rket liberalization policies were applied,
both in relation to'.the_preceding period and -in comparison to
similar cases in Argentina and Uruguay.

It was also radical in

I

its brutality towar4s adversely affected economic sectors,
including many capiialists and landowners.

28 For this view of upper class behavior"see, Charles H.
-Anderson, Politics cind Economic Change in Latin America (New
York: D. Van Nos:trand co., 1967); Philippe c. Schmitter, Interest
Conflibt and Political Change in Brazil; Maurice Zeitlin and
Richard E. _Ratcliff,, Landlords and Capitalists: ·The Dominant
Class of Chile (PriI1,ceton: Princeton University :Press, 1988).
i

29 For those pchicies see, Sebastian Edwards and Alejandra
Cox Edward~, Mon·etatism and Liberalization-: The Chilean
Experiment-(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987).
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I

I

!

I

The key q1:1esti~n for this period was: what conditions
i

allowed powerful, bµt heretofore marginalized, capitalist groups

I

to dominate economic policymaking?

Changes in two major power

i

sources--economic apd state institutional (or political)--as well
r
i

as the network of r~lations between them, opened up a window of
I

I

opportunity for the\ radical internationalists to prevail.
i

With respect tb the economic sources of power, international
1

and domestic factor~ combined to strengthen and embolden radical
internationalists. !External factors (oil price shocks, changes
in the source$ of ekternal savings for investment from
.

i

multilateral institutions to private commercial banks, and
j

}

declining copper prices) aggravated balance o.f payments problems.
l

This weakened ISI industrialists, the most interested in
I

maintaining gradual)adjustment to a more open economy.

Their

t

dependence on imporied intermediate goods drained already
I
I

insufficient hard c1r:r;-ency reserves. ·conversely, those factors
strengthened financiers and commercial interests with access to
t

funds from international banks, as well as agro-indust.rial
'1

extractive groups itj timber, sea products and_ fruit.- These
groups contributed Jo foreign exchange reserves, thus, making
.

I

i

them potentially mor;e attractive to the military as support
i

groups for long-tei:-nt economic growth.
I

These internatilonal economic conditions, whi'le important,
T

were nevertheless td,o diffuse to explain the extraordinary
.triumph of radical i!nternationalists.

Past policies--

I
I

specifically Unidad ~opular's relatively widespread
I

l
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nationalization of large-scale business and banki:ng.;..-had weakened
ISI industrialists.

They opened the opportunity for a

reorganization of capital that was quite distinct from similar
cases.

After the overthrow of Allende, the privatization of

firms, a deep recession in 1975-76, and financial system
deregulation allowed internationally connected financiers (key
radical internationalists) to inexpensively control leading
Chilean firms. 30

By this process, radical internationalists

built "giant new international finance, export and import-oriented
conglomerates..

· These internafionalist conglomerates soon

°

3 For an account of this process see, Fernando Dahse, El
mapa de la extrema rigueza (Sq.ntiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1979);
Andres Sanfuentes, "Los grupos econ6micos: control y politicas,."
Estudios Cieplan, no. 15, 1984. Data from Dahse's study show
that by 1977 the internationalist conglomerates controlled about
60% of the private sector's share of.the financial system.
This
accountin·g includes former traditional conglomerates that quickly
shifted to more internationalist profiles. They also controlled
over 50% of the combined ass·ets of Chile's largest 250 companies.
Moreover, when financial sector reform was on the policy agenda
the radical Chicago Boys who controlled the Central Bank had
close business ties to the internationaltst conglomerates. They
invited executives from those congl:omerates to participate in the
discussions. By the same token, CORFO VP's also had close links
to internationalist conglomerates, such as Qruzat-Larrain and
Edwards. These data from, a personal interview with -Juan
Villarzu who was budget·director at the time and Bance, Central de
Chile, Estudios monetarios III: Seminario de mercados de
capitales (Santiago: n.p., 1974). For a further elaboration of
these theme~ see, Eduardo Silva, "Capitalist Coalitions and
Economic Policymaking in Authoritarian Chile," Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1991. For a
description of how the Chicago Boys took over key offices frommore moderate persons see, Veronica Montecinos, "Economics and
Power: Chilean Economists in Government, 1958-1985, 11 Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1988; and Arturo Fontaine
Aldunate, Los economistas·y el presidente Pinochet (Santiago:
Zig-Zag, 1988).
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overshadowed more traditional conglomerates that had supported
gradualism (see Table 1).
The economic weakness of ISI industriaiists· emboldened
radical internationalists, operating in a context of growing
·economic opportunity, to confront the gradualists as early as
mid-1974~

Nevertheless, the extremists' economic strength did

not suffice for their victory.

Parallel changes in state

organization (sparked by a power struggle in the military junta)
opened up chances for the establishment of new networks between
economic and state power sources.
Between 1974 and 1978, General Pinochet gained ascendancy
within the military junta and personalized his power.

As his

star rose, he formed increasingly tight links with the Chicago
Boys. 31

The Chicago Boys, however, were not just a caste-like

group of neoliberal technocrats.

Many of the key figures had

close ties to ever more powerful radical internationalist
conglomerates that were gaining coherence through their corporate
acquisitions policy.

By embracing the Chicago Boys, Pinochet

formed an alliance with ideologues and conglomerates·that
controlled the most dynamic sectors of the economy, which.gave
them the ability to sustain radical neoliberal policies.

31 For Pinochet's rise to power see, Arturo Valenzuela, "The
Military in Power: The Consolidation of One Man Rule in Chile,"
in·Paul w. Drake.and Ivan Jaksic, eds., The Struggle for
Democracy in Chile, 1982-88 (Lincoln: University ,of Nebraska
Press, forthcoming). In addition to Valenzuela see, O'Brien, The
Pinochet Decade; Cavallo; et al., La historia oculta; and
Fonatine, El presidente Pinochet.
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The internationalist conglomerates' first victory came in
April 1975.with the appointment of Sergio de Castro to the
Ministry of Economy, Pablo Baraona as-president of the Central
Bank, and Francisco Soza as Vice President of·CORFO.

All had

close business and/or personal ties to either the Cruzat-Larrain
or BHC conglomerates.

cauas·, a Chicago Boy who sponsored drastic

deflation and later develc:>ped business ties to Cruzat Larrain,
continued as Minister of Finance.

INSERT TABLE 2

Radical neoliberal policies followed quickly on th·e heels of
the new appointments.

Drastic deflation, a downward revision and

acceleration of tariff reductions and rap:j.d privatization began
in April through July, 1975.

As more Chicago Boys and their

sympathizers gained office in the next years, and as the
internationalist conglomerates expanded (see Tables 1 and 2),
more neoliberal policies followed.

By 1979 Chile had a flat

tariff rate of 10% and, a. fix·ed exchange rate of 39 pesos to the
dollar.

Moreover, the Edwards conglomerate, which had been a

traditional type, became more international in profile, forged
close business ties with Cruzat-Larrain, and supported .radical
neoliberal policies in El Mercurio editorials.

Chile's leading

conservative newspaper was also an Edwards group company.
Pinochet and the radical internationalists served each other
well.

The radical internationalists had been in sharp conflict
24

TABLE 2
ECONOIIIC INTERESTS OF ICEY MINISTERS, 1975-87
ASSOCIA·
TION
MEMBER

CONGLOMERATE AFFILIATION & TYPE
RI RFT I FT MNC N F CB

INSTITUTION

NAME

FINANCE

Cauas
de Castro
de la Cuadra
Lilders
Caceres
Escobar
Buchi

07/74-12/76
12/76-04/82
04/82-08/82
08/82-02/83
02/83-04/84
04/84-02/85
02/85-

C-L x*
C·L x
Aetna
BHC x
IO

de Castro
Baraona
Kelly
.Federici
Ramos
Danus
Lilders
Martfn
Passicot
.Collados
Delano

04/75-12/76
12/76~12/78 SNA/SFF
12/78-12/79
12/79-12-80
12-80-04/82 >Army
04/82-08/82 Army
08/82-02/83
04/83-08/83
08/83-04/84
04/84-07/85
07/85-07/87

C·L
C·L
BHC
C·L

ECONOMY

CENTRAL BANK
Presidents
Baraona
Bardon
. de la Cuadra
Kast
Caceres
Errazuriz
Ibanez
Seguel
Vice Pres.

VP CORFO

BUDGET

AGRICULTURE

Bardon
de la Cuadra
Errazuriz
de U! Barra
Tapia
Ossa
Ruiz
Serrano

TENURE

1975-1976
1976-1981
1981-1982
1982-1982
1982-1983
1983-1984
1985-1985
1985-

04/75-10/75
10/75-07/79
08/79-12/80
12/80-03/81;
03/81-08/83
08/83-12/83
12/83·

Mendez
Costabal '

1975-1981
1981-1984

Fuenzalida
Sellllle

1984-1985
1985-

SNA/SFF

12/80-12/81
12/81-

Edw
BHC

X

X

x

x
x

X X
X

x

x

x

X X

L

,X

X
X

X

X

C·L x
BC
Aetna

X X
X X

X

X

10
BHC

X

x

X
X

X

'BC
Aetna
BHC x

X X
X X

X

X

Matte

X

X

X

X

Army
Army
Army
Army
Army
Army

C·L
Edw

X

. C·L

X

X

C·L X
L & Matte

Police Generals to 04/78
Marquez
04/78-12/80
Toro
Prado

X
X

1975-1976
1976-1981
1981-1981
1981-1982
1982-1983
1983-1984
1984•1985
1985-

Soza
Danus
Ramos
Varela
Ramfrez
Perez
Hormazabal

X X
X X
X X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

C-L x
(Agro-export)

X

Police
(Agro-export-import)

Legend: Conglomerates: C-L, Cruzat-Larrafn; BHC, Javier Vial group; Edw, Edwards; IO,
Ibanez Ojeda; L, Luksic; BC, Banco Concepci6n; RI, Radical Internationalist; RFT; Radical
Former Traditional; FT, Former Traditional; MNC, Multinational Corp.; N, Neutral (not
Internationalist or Traditional, has competitive enterprises, mainly in food); F, has
interests in a financial institution; CB, Chicago Boy.
Sources: Colegio de Periodistas, Diccionario Biografico, selected years; C~ny annual
reports, Banco Central, lnstituciones Financieras, selected years; .!!.2l!:, no. 346, March 7,
1984; Fernando Dahse, El Mapa de ta Extrema Rigueza.
Cauas shows up as president of top C-L financial institutions beginning in 1978.

with the moderate. groups of the,--gradualist coalition since the
1960s. 32

Radical internationalists needed Pinochet in order to

impose their extreme neoliberal policies.

By the same token,

Pinochet need~d the radicals to consolidate his power.

They

opposed more traditionalist economic interests that favored a
more corporatist political regime.
As a result, a tight network formed between the radical
internationalists, with their increasing economic power, and
Pinochet with his expanding sources of political power.

This

network displaced the one that the gradualists had formed with
the broader military movement and junta in 1973.

With Pinochet

and the radical coalition's triumph, a highly centralized
authoritarian regime allowed the Chicago Boys to impose their
policy option and ignore pressure from business peak associations
that defended the more gradual approach.

From Radical to Pragmatic Neoliberal Policies, 1983-1988

In the previous two periods, domestic economic and political
crises influenced the building and unraveling of capitalist
coalitions in a much more immediate way than changing
international economic conditions.
reversed dramatically.

In 1982 the situation

External economic crisis provided the

32 The first big public outburst of this conflict occurred
during Jorge Alessandri's 1970 presidential campaign. Sergio de
Castro, a campaign advisor, wanted to develop a radical
neoliberal economic platform. Cooler heads prevai-led.
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catalyst for coalitional shifts that led to the replacement of
radical neoliberalism with a :more pragmatic neoliberalism between
1983 and 1988.

The pragmatic neoliberal model tolerated

reflationary policies and economic restructuring was no longer at
0

the expense of the industrial sector. 33

In other words, pump

priming and industrial policy became part.of the policy package.
This section will consider two questions.

First, how

external economic shocks affected the unraveling:of the dominant
radical coalition and the formation of a rival pragmatic
coalition.

Second, how the radical coalition's econo}llic

weakness, coupled with the threat of a broader interclass
coalition between the pragmatic coalition and middle classes,
induced Pinochet to abandon radical neoliberal policies.

In

other words the pragmatic coalition shaped policy agendas but
required political power to implement policy.

Pinochet needed

policy coalitions capable of sustaining economic growth to remain
in power.
By 1980, high levels of international liquidity had drawn

skeptical business and landowning groups to the extreme
neoliberal coalition that had the radical internationalist
conglomerates at the core.

A flood of foreign savings during

33 For a further elaboration of the pragmatic neoliberal

model see, Eduardo Silva, IIThe Political Economy of Chile's
Transition to Democracy: From Radical to Pragmatic Neoliberal
Policies," in Drake and· Jaksic, eds., The struggle for Democracy
in Chile. Also see, Laurence Whitehead, "The Adjustment Process
in Chile: A Comparative Perspective," in Rosemary Thorp and
Laurence Whitehead, eds., La.tin American Debt and the Adjustment
Crisis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
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that period fed an economic boom that helped to sustain social
groups excluded from the policy process.

Easy credit allowed

producers for domestic markets to overcome the negative effects
of a 10% flat tariff rate.

They·borrowed to expand, diversify or

survive in an atmosphere of prosperity.

The middle class, as

never before, borrowed cheap dollars and consumed goods and
services that had been the preserve of upper classes. 34
The international debt crisis of the early 1980s ripped
asunder the broader coalition that radical internationalists had
managed to form with most sectors of capital and landowners. 35
In 1982, the debt crisis contributed to a collapse of the Chilean
financial system, the economy plunged as production stopped (GDP
fell 14%), unemployment soared to over 25%. 36
The economic debacle had two immediate effects.

First, the

radical conglomerates .that stood at the core of the coalition
both contributed to the economic crisis and fell victim to it.
The directors of these financial institution-led economic groups
had buflt their empires on highly leveraged buy-outs and were
dependent on ample int~rnational liquidity for their operations.
34 For an overview.of these processes see, Alejandro Foxley,
Latin American Experiments with Neoconservative Economics. Firm
·behavior was gleaI'1,ed from per·sonal interviews with executives and
selected company annual reports.
35 For the Latin American debt crisis see, Barbara stallings
and Robert Kaufman, eds., Debt and Democracy in Latin America
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); William L. Canak, ed., Lost.
Promises: Debt, Austerity and Development in Latin 1-Unerica
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
36 For the 1982-84 economic crisis see, Sebastian Edwards
and Alejandra Cox Edwards, Monetarism and Liberalization.
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When the flow of foreign savings dried up they ran into cash flow
problems and raised interest rates to usurious levels in order to
capture domestic savj,ngs.

After cabinet shuffles and failed

government attempts to lower interest rates, in January 1983,
Minister of Finance Rolf Liiders placed the radical conglomerate's
leading financial institutions in receivership, or liquidated
them. 37

Since many of the major firms and holding companies of

those conglomerates could not meet their debt schedules the
governm,ent wound up in control of them too, although · it left
their management in private hands.
Second, the end of the foreign debt-led boom demonstrated
just how thin the ideological commitment to radical neoliberalism
was among most upper class elites.

During the boom business and

landowning·peak associations extolled the virtues of the radical
free market model. 38

Beset by economic hard times, however,

and in the wake of the collapse of the radical conglomerates,, the
peak associations--under the umbrella of the Confederation of
Production and Commerce (CPC)--turned to the task of d~veloping
an alternative economic model.
By 1983 the business and landowning associations affiliated
with the CPC had formed a cohesive pragmatic neoliberal coalition
3 7 Sergio de la Cuadra and Salvador Valdes, i1Myths · and Facts
about Instability in Financial Liberalization in Chile: 19741983,"in Philip L. Brock, ed., If Texas were Chile: Financial
Risk and Regulation in Commodity Exporting Economies (San
Francisco: ICS Press, forthcoming).
38 The annual reports of .the SFF, SNA; and CNC, and SFF/SNA
publications such as Informative SFF and El Campesino, were
remarkably uncritical between 1979-1981.
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and formulated a detailed and highly publicized economic recovery
program. 39

The pragmatic coalition supported high real

exchange rates, low across-the-board tariffs with protect1on
against unfair competition, a reflationary monetary policy, low
interest rates, debt relief, sectoral policies (such.as export
promotion,. construction projects, agricultural development), and'
a more inclusive, institutionalized policymaking proc;:ess.
Explicit bargaining between sectoral peak associations
cemented tne pragmatic neoliberal coalition.

Internationalists

(although not radical ones) dominateq•with industrialists
producing for domestic markets (who had regained control of the
SFF) in a subordinate, but not excluded, position.
gradualist coalition reversed.

It was the

Internationalists in commerce

(CNC), mining (SONAMI), finance (Asociaci6n de Bancos e
Instituciones Fi~ancieras, ABIF), landowners (SNA) and the SFF,
all, supported high real exchange rates--they encouraged exports
and discouraged imports.

Likewise, all wanted low interest

rates, debt relief and changes in the policymaking process.

In

addition, the SFF ·had wanted,differentiated tariff schedules with
a maximum of 35% ad valorem.

But once again it was .outvoted in

the CPC by the internationalists and the SNA who wanted to keep

39 Confederaci6n de la Producci6n .y Comercio, "Recuperaci6n
econ6mica: Analisis y proposiones," Santiago de Chile, July 1983,

and related documents presented by member associati.ons. For its
genesis see, Guillermo Campero, Los gremios empresariales.
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low (15-20%) across-the-board rates. 40

As in the past, the SFF

had no coalitional partners, and, thus, had to content itself
with protectio!l ·against unfair competition.
In 1983, Pinochet only grudgingly gave in to some of the
pragmatic coalition's demands.

He acquiesced to minor

concessions, hoping that the proper mix would split the new
allianc.e. 41

Between 1984 and 1985, however, the government

adbpted the bulk of the CPC's economic program, and virtually all
of it by 1988. 42

Where discrepancies existed in targets, these

may be put down to the fact that the program had been a platform
for negotiation with the regime, not .an ultimatum for·capitulation.
Pinochet might largely have continued to ignore the
pragmatic coalition had it not been for escalating political
protest against his rule by :middle and.lower elass sectors and
their political'Party allies.

By the end of 19S3, the largest

oppo.sition grouping had formed Alianza Democratica, a coalition
40 With respect to the tariff issue, the SFF designated a
study commissiQn in January-February of 1982. ;:tissued a

recommendation in favor. of .differentiated tariffs in October, see
SFF, "Informe final de la comisi6n SFF para estudiar una
alternativa ·al sistema arancelario," October 20, 1982. In a
March ~2, 1982 memorandum that defined the_ business -definition of
the social market system, the CPC explicitly supported low,
across-the-board tariffs. In November, · 1982, the SNA flatly declared itself-against differentiated tariffs, see Minutes of
CPC Executive Committee meeting no 577, November 25, 1982.
S_ONAMI had gone on record against such tariffs in August, see
Estrategia, August 16-22, 1982. The Finance and Construction
associations were at best ambivalent.
41 This was .the significance behind the Caceres-Martin

economic team.
42 For a more detailed account see, Eduardo Silva, "The

Political Economy of Chile's Transition to Democracy."
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of centrist and center-left parties dominated by.Christian
Democrats.

They had begun staging monthly protests 'beginning in

May 1983 and emphasized negotiation with the military and
...._

conservatives---but not Pinochet--in order to effect a rapid
transition to democratic rule. 43
Alianza Democratica (AD) attempted to draw members of the
pragmatic coalition--especially industrialists producing for
domestic markets--to its side.

It repeatedly stressed respect

for private property, a mixed economy with ample room for private
enterprise, and industrialization. 44

Meanwhile, sectors of the

pragmatic coalition, out of frustration with the lack of response
to their proposals by the government, issued veiled threats that
they might join the opposition. 45
43 For the composition and evolution of mass mobilization

and its impact on the regime see, Manuel Antonio Garret6n,
Reconstruir la politica: Transici6n y consolidaci6n_democratica
en Chile (Santiago: Editorial Andante, 1987; and "The Political
Opposition and.the Party System under the Military Regime," •in
Drake and Jaksic, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile.
44 For AD's essentially conciliatory economic policy stance
see, Alejandro Foxley ,· "Algunas Condiciones para una
Democratizaci6n Estable: El Caso de Chile," Estudios Cieplan, no.
9, 1982; Cieplan, Reconstrucci6n econ6mica para la democracia
(Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1983); a.nd the Christian
Democratic Party•.s Proyecto Alternative (Santiago: Editorial
Aconcagua, 1984), especially volume 2.
45 For exampl~, when the CPC distributed its economic
recovery plan to government ministers the SFF cautioned that
although the private. sector did not wish to break with the
government it might be forced into :opposition ,(Que Pasa, no. 639,
July 7, 1983). In the same spirit; Jorge Fontaine, president of
the CPC, declared that business only sought confrontation with
governments when the survival of the free enterprise system was
at stake. The authorities should recognize that adherence to
orthodox deflation would lead to perdition (Hoy, no. 311, July 6,
198.3) •
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Pinochet responded by appointing Ministers of Finance and
Economy, Luis Escobar and Modesto Collados, that cleaz-ly
represented the interests of the pragmatic coalition in April
1984.

Escobar, an internationalist who would not neglect the

interests of producers for domestic markets, was widely
recognized in business circles as a person sympathetic to the
CPC's economic recovery program.

He.had extensive ties to

international finance• and to Chilean·manufactures for domestic
markets (through the.Banco de Fomento de Valparaiso, a regional
industrial development bank).

He also had been the Chilean

z-epresentative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank.

He favored an expansionary monetary policy, differentiated

tariffs, and greater deficit spending.

Meanwhile,' Colladoshad

been president of the Construction chamber when the CPC
elaborated its recovery program, and Minister of Public Works
prior to April 1984. 46

He supported an expansionary monetary

policy, proposed the development of a Triennial Plan that
emphasized construction and public works, protection for
agriculture, and a s.olution. to the financial crisis.

He opposed

differentiated tariffs.
The Escobar-Collados team extended the pragmatic coalition's
network to the state .and crowded the radicals out--at least at
46 He was president of the ·construction Chamber when the CPC
developed its economic recovery program. As Minister of Public
Works he had labored to implement a government construction
program which the Construction. Chamber had.elaborated in 1983
(Interview with Pablo Araya, professional staff, Camara Chilena
de cosntruccion, CChC).
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the top levels.

The continuation of Jorge Prado in Agriculture

and Samuel Lira in mining further bolstered the new coalition's
political power.

Prado, vice president of the SNA at the time of

his appointment, had primary interests in agricultural exports
and secondary investments in agricultural production for domestic
markets-.

Lira was a prominent member of the mine owner's

association, .SONAMI.
Furthermore, Escobar and Collados modified the policy
process in-ways that reinforced the nexus between ministers of
s tate and the pragmatic coalition.
1

The business peak

associations' access to policy-makers and participation in
policymaking became more routinized.

To begin with, Collados

included them in the formulation of his Triennial Plan where they
formed an integral part of the program's sectoral commissions.
This allowed the peak associations to work with government
off icial.s in turning the sectoral proposals of the CPC' s economic
recovery program into state policy.
Collados opened up a second avenue of participation in May
1984, the Social and Economic Council ·(SEC) •

An advisory body to

the President (Pinochet), the SEC brought together
representatives of the private, public and labor sectors to
discuss policy ·recommendations and demands.

Its economic

commissions--dominated by business peak association leaders-... gave
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private sector representatives of the pragmatic·coalition another
vehicle of participation in the policymaking process. 47
Unfortunately, the new economic team also mirrored the
pragmatic coalition's tensions, and that proved to be Escobar•s
unmaking.

He supported the SFF's position on a differentiated

tariff schedule, which led him into a direct conflict with
Collado.s and the dominant sector of pragmatic coalition.
Pinoch·et sided with Coll ados.

When Escobar tried to selectively

raise tariffs through other means Pinochet dismissed him in
February 1985.
Nevertheless, the ministers that followed Escobar, and
eventually Collados, maintained the network between the pragmatic
coalition and state institutions.

Some appointments, such as

that of Hernan Biichi in Finance, may have even strengthened it.
The P!~gmatic coalition had suffered its worst tensions when the
ministers of Finance and Economy reproduced the strains between
its dominant and subordinate faction over the trade issue.
Biichi, 'by contrast, was a neutral figure.

He appeared to have no

direct:private economic interests, was a career bureaucrat under
Pinochet, favored internationalist groups yet did not dismiss
domestic market producers.

His appointment, then represented a

balance of the interests in the pragmatic coalition and helped to
sooth its rivalries.
4 7 Augusto z. Lecaros, "Representaci6n de los intereses de
la sociedad en el estado y los consejos econ6micos y sociales,"
M.A. Thesis, Institute de Ciencia Politica, Pontif:icia
Univers:idad cat6lica, 1989.
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Meanwhile, ministers in subordinate economic cabinet
positions .continued to reflect the pragmatic coalition·• s
composition.

As before, they were businessmen with major

international ·economic interests, but who also had a stake in
domestic market production.

Thus, their economic interests

replicated the balance between the pragmatic coalition's two
major factions.

Prado and Lira remained in charge of the

Ministries of Agriculture and.Mining.

Juan Delano, who replaced

Collados in the Ministry of Economy, had been vice pl'.'esident of
the National Chamber of Commerce at the time of his appointment.
He had. supported low, across-the-board tariffs, but was not
against selective prote'Ction for industry against unfair
competition.
Between 1985 and 1988, further changes in the policymaking
process expanded and institutionalized the pragmatic coalition's
links to state economic policymaking institutions.

In early

1986, pelano created standing National Commissions fer Commerce

and Industry within the Ministry of Economy.

They gave the CPC

ana its member associations.a place on government policymaking
working groups~ 48

Business and.landowning peak assoc1ations

also gained increasing access to the junta's Legislative
commissions, which formalized the division of labor among the
48 Interviews with Gustavo Ramdohr, president of the
Nontraditional Exporters' Association (ASEXMA); Jorge Fonatine,
former president of the CPC; Jaime Ale, director of planning of
the SFF:; Lee Ward, director of the National Commission for
External Commerce; minutes of the meetings of the Commission's
Subco~ission for Draw-back Legislation.
35

branches of tlle military-and Carabineros.

The Constitution of

1980 had created the Legislative Commissions in order to
establish a "legislative process" for the transition to a
protected democracy. "Legislative bills" circulated.among peak_
associations w_i.th ample time for these, to make observations and
amendments, in a word, to lobby.

Business leaders, as well as

junta members could introduce "legislation. n. 49
These networks a;t.lowed the pragmatic coalition to
consolidate its gains and influence policy formulation in two
additional areas between 1985 and 1988.

To begin with, the SFF

had long wanted a policy of export promotion for industry,- which
it finally. received.

Secondly, all coalition members demanded

rapid privatization ·of firms that the government llad taken over
when it placed bankrupt financial firms in receivership.
'

-

Privatization began slowly in 1985 and steadily picked up pace to
1988.

From the pragmatic: coalition's point of view, the process
\

•

r

had the virtue of strengthening its economic base because of the
way in which_ it concentrated assets in surviving conglomerates.
Export sectors tended to dominate in most of these conglomerates,
but a healthy component of their assets were also in the domestic
market sector.

49 Interview with Jaime Ale, SFF director of planning.
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International and Domestic Crisis and the Relationship between
- Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Economic Policy in
Authoritarian Regimes

The comparison across three policy periods in Pinochet's
Chi1e--gradual, radical and pragmatic adjustment--showed that
distinct capitalist and landowning coalitions helped shape policy
agenda setting and formulation for each option.
changed, so did policy.

When coalitions

Clearly, reg-ime type--authori tarianism--

and the nature of military rule were crucial to outcomes as well.
Shi-fti:qg coalitions of businessmen and agriculturali$ts needed
political sources of power.

Pinochet needed the collaboration of

economic actors capable of advancing his quest for socio-economic
transformation and personal power.

These mutual interests

resulted in the formation of networks between the two.

Those

networks changed as policy coalitions gained and lost economic
power and as Pinochet's political fortunes rose and fel~.
With respect to the dynamics of coalitional change the
framework that emerges from this case study is necessarily
tentative, but highly suggestive.

It implies that variation in

the type and severity of economic change at the world level,
together with differences in the degree of domestic economic and
political crises, affect·coalitional possibilities ainong classbased. social gro~ps·.

This, in turn, modifies networks between

social coalitions and state institutions and actors.
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FIGURE 1

Relqtionship between International system Change,
Domestic Economic and Political Crisis,
Social Coalition, State Structure and Policy Outcome
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The Chilean case suggests that when international economic
change is secular and diffuse--as was l~rgely the case in the

a background

1960s and early 1970s--external factors play more of

role in the alteration of.accommodations among business and.
landowning groups.

If such change combines with deep domestic

economic and political crises one may exp·ect coalitional shifts
and policy change, but not 180 degree turns.
To illustrate the point, in Chile.a Marxist ·government
unleashed a violent political and economic.crisis.

In the

aftermath of the coup d'etat, sharpening intra-upper class
conflict led to an emphasis on gradual tariff reduction.
Relatively extensive nationalization during the Allende period,
which had weakened the industrial sector, contributed to that
intra-class friction.

However, gradual change at the

international level in the 1960s and early 1970s influenced
adherence to a developmental model based on industrialization.
By comparison, in the mid 1960s, Brazil and Argentina
experienced a change to mil.itary authoritarian rule in a similar,
although somewhat more benign, international setting.
result, they too emphasized industrialization.

As a

However, Brazil

and Argentina's economic development strategy did not include
opening their economies to trade~ 50

This framework suggests

SO For economic policies in Arg~ntina and Brazil during .this
period see, William c. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of
Argentine Political Economy (Stanford:·stanford University Press,
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that that difference was partially due to the absence of a prior
policy of extensive nationalization.

That had two effects.

First, it stymied the outbreak of intra-class conflict at levels
that influenced a policy of gradual opening in Chile.

second,

industry was stronger because it was secure in its property and
the world system reinforced continuation of industrial policy.
If the international economic system changes rapidly it will
have a greater effect on the fortunes of incumbent coalitions.
The consequences may be even more severe if external shock is
accompanied by violent sociai upheaval and political change.

In

Chile, in the mid 1970s, oil price shocks and changes in sources
of foreign savings to international commercial banks that were
recycling petrodollars coincided with a period of great economic
and political turbulence.

These events sharpened conflict

between radical internationalists and gradualists, as defined by
their situation in the dom~stic and international structure of
production.

The fight over tariff reduction, shock treatment

stabilization, and financial system liberalization was also a
struggle among Chilean capitalists and landowners over which
sectors would benefit the most from future economic growth.

Both

the radical internationalists and Pinochet yearned to break away
from the gradualist coalition.
personal military rule.

Pinochet wanted to install

The radical internationalists with

access to the new sources of foreign savings wanted to reap the

1989); ·Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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benefit of rapid economic change, and no doubt felt that-it was
for the good of the nation.

These mutual interests, in the

context of a rapidly changing world economy and strife within thejunta, set the stage for the creation of networks between
Pinochet,- Chicago Boys, and radical internationalj,.st
conglomerates.

This alliance of state and· economic power

expressed the essence of the neoliberal. model: the military's
reliance on the domestic·partners of international finance.
In 1982,_the sudden lack of high levels of international
liquidity destroyed the economic power of the radical neoliberal
coalition and contributed to the emergence of the pragmatic
neoliberal coalition.-

In this new international context,

domestic economic and political crisis persuaded Pinochet to
f.orge new networks with this new coalition.

However, in the

absence of dramatic changes in the military regime the general
internationalist thrust of the economic development model
remained.

Manufacturers for domestic markets still had no allies

for a project that incl_uded higher levels of protection.
Partial but suggestive data on Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay
underscore these relationships between international and domestic
crisis and economic c~ange. 51

Like Chile, Argentina and

51 Howard Handelman, "Economic Poli~y and Elite Pressures,"
in Howard Handelman and Thomas G. Sanders, eds., Military
Government and the Movement toward Democracy in .South America
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); M.H.J. Finch, · 11 The
Military Regime and Dominant Class Interests· in Uruguay, 19731982," in Philip O'Brien and Paul Cammack, eds., Generals in
Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985);-William c.
Smith, The Crisis of Argentine Political Economy: and
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Uruguay experienced social conflict and political breakdown in
the context of a sharp international change that favored private
financial markets in the mid 1970s.

As in Chile, newly installed

military governments embraced neoliberal projects that included·a
substantial reduction in protection.

They relied on the domestic

partners of burgeoning international finance to overcome their
economic crises and renew growth.

In Brazili by contrast, when

world economic difficulties began to sharpen in the mid 1970s the
military regime was well established and its economy was not.in
crisis.

In the absence of domestic economic and political

upheaval the networks between state and private sector actors
· remained stable and policy did.not shift to neoliberalism.
Increased international liquidity benefitted existing
relationships.
The proposed analytical framework· also suggests that,
compared to Chile, lower and more incomplete reductions in levels
of protection for industry in Argentina and Uruguay were
influenced by two factors: differences·in the supporting
capitalist coalitions and their,networks to state actors, and
divergences in the structure of military rule.

Chile had a

highly personalized and centralized form of military rule.· It
combined with sharp-intra-upper class conflict--triggered by
relatively extensive nationalization under Allende--to produce
Chile's extreme opening to the world economy.

By contrast, in

"Hyperinflation, Macroeconomic Instability and Neoliberal _
Restructuring in Democratic Argentina, 11 in Edward Ep'stein, ed.,
The New Democracy in Argentina (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).
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Argentina and Uruguay military juntas ruled, and there was an
absence of intra-capitalist conflict over the reapportionment of
expropriated assets.

This combination could have influenced the

rise of informal networks between the state and- the private
sector that included Argentine and Uru9uayan equivalents to
Chile's traditional conglomerates.

The military juntas may have

valued them more because the lack of expropriation made them
stronger than their Chilean counterparts.
In comparative perspective, then, socialist policies of
nationalization and land reform heavily influenced Chile's
violent shift from a closed to an open economy. 52

They set in

motion uncharacteristically severe conflict among businessmen and
landowners.

The other cases lacked that experience and their

economic openings were shallower and their neoliberal policies
less sustained.
sufficient.

Of course, intra-class sfrife alone was not

It combined with a specific conjuncture of world

economic and domestic political change.
In sum, differences in the severity of external shocks and
domestic economic and political crisis .have an impact on the
nature of intra-capitalist and landowner conflicts. - The deeper
the international crisis, and the more intense the domestic
economic and political upheaval, the greater the chances for more
extreme intra-upper class conflict.

It follows 'that in labor
,

52_ This approach expands on previous notions of the relationship between the severity of the threat from below policy
change in the southern Cone. It argues that the policy content
of the "threat from below" affects intra-upper class conflicts,
and that those struggles influence policy outcomes.
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repressive movements, this increases the opportunities for
coalitions be.tween narrow but powerful economic groups and
polit_ically ambitious military men.

Thus, the great~r the -

possibilities for variation in economic-development models.
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